Is Daitō losing the Hypersonic Arms Race?
Aizawa-Shinoda's Air-launched Rapid Response Offensive Weapon (ARROW) is intended to travel
just over 800 kilometers in just 10 minutes once fired from a P-13 BomberFor the first time in years, Daitō is lagging behind its international competitors in a technology race with far-reaching military and diplomatic implications. Hypersonic weapons are designated one of six developing technologies—artificial intelligence, lethal autonomous weapons systems, directed energy weapons, biotechnology, and quantum technology—that the Ministry of War believes could dictate the outcomes of future conflicts, but as Daitō's competitors continue to field new hypersonic missiles, the Empire's own efforts seemingly continue to be met with delays and failures. But why? How is it possible that Daitō, with its comparatively large annual defense spending, can't get a hypersonic weapon into service while Rokkenjima, which spends a roughly similar amount each year, has been capable of fielding such a system? The truth is, as it tends to be, complicated and the question may very well misrepresent the true nature of the hypersonic arms race we now find ourselves in.
Despite having previously led the world in hypersonic technologies and even having had plans for hypersonic aircraft as far back as the 60s, the past twenty years have forced a shift away from advancing military technologies and toward the large-scale employment of existing combat systems. Like the previous generations of the J-7 and the J-13, hypersonic missiles were seen as incredibly expensive weapons with no potent threat they were needed to address. Now, with tensions seemingly on the rise between many world powers, the Ministry of War is making up for lost time the best way it knows: by throwing money at the problem. In 2020, the Ministry of War devoted just over ¥160 billion ($2 billion) to developing hypersonic technologies, including missiles. In 2021, that number jumped to ¥256 billion ($3.2 billion). it once again grew in the War Ministry's 2022 budget, with ¥304 billion ($3.8 billion) allocated, a number which is likely to stay the same for fiscal year 2023. All told, there are roughly 50 separate hypersonic programs drawing funds from this pool, seven of which are for publicly disclosed missile programs.
Why is Daitō behind in fielding hypersonic missiles?
The Empire is indeed lagging behind the competition in fielding operational hypersonic missiles, but the word
operational can be fairly subjective in this context. Many times, a new aircraft, for example, has been claimed to be in operational service despite there being only a handful of manufactured aircraft and a few prototypes. By Daitōjin standards, such aircraft would be many, many years away from earning such a label. But even so, the popular conception of the Daitōjin hypersonic weapons program being years, if not decades, away from fielding such a weapon are, frankly, misguided.
For starters, the word
hypersonic has a cutting-edge connotation to it, and recent media coverage of these technologies has treated the realm of hypersonic flight as though it were pulled straight from a science fiction movie. Recent films, such as
Best Guy: Odyssey, with its opening involving a hypersonic aircraft, have certainly played a role in bolstering that image. The truth, however, is that hypersonic platforms have been around for decades, and many of them are recognizable to the masses. The hypersonic barrier is Mach 5, or approximately 6,125.4 kilometers per hour. At these speeds, the air itself becomes the enemy as it impacts the vehicle, creating enough friction to damage or even destroy most common aircraft and missile materials. The UHS Orbiter, however, regularly exceeded Mach 25, or more than
30,627 kilometers per hour, during reentry. Similar vehicles fielded in recent years can also reach such blistering speeds. In fact, practically every ballistic missile and spacecraft ever launched has been hypersonic in nature.
That means that not only does Daitō already possess a wide variety of hypersonic platforms just like many other nations, even corporations such as TransOrbital and Nebulus can claim hypersonic capabilities. That's not to say that we should adjust the hypersonic weapons conversation to include everything from the Suzaku Program to the modern UHS and PLS flights, of course. Rather, it's meant to highlight the selective use of the term "hypersonic" in most media to frame the discussion specifically around the capabilities Daitō lacks. That is, after all, the more dramatic story. As one observer noted, in many ways, Daitō is running a very different race than what Rokkenjima is trying to trigger.
Not trying to beat around the bush, but as early as the mid-1980s, Daitō was operating a reusable hypersonic platform for the military, in the form of a specialized UHS orbiter,
Saikyō. The orbiter, which was turned over to NASDA—Now DNSA—in the late-90s, was used largely on classified missions, although owing to its rather unique use in polar orbit, it is safe to assume it was used for reconnaissance missions, as well as a number of military-run experiments. While this capability was leapfrogged by the Achkaerinese in the 2010s with their
Starlight program, which bears similarities to Daitō's own Type 66 Orbital Reconnaissance Vehicle, it nonetheless demonstrates that up until recently, Daitō has held a resounding lead in that field.
The Competition isn't as far ahead as it seems
A Rokkenjiman Ifrit missile, launched 21 Jan, 2023 Even in terms of specifically envelope-pushing hypersonic technologies in the contemporary sense of the word, the Empire again has a solid pedigree. As far back as 2004, NASDA's 3.65-meter long scramjet technology demonstrator known as the Shi-91A reached Mach 9.6 in testing. In 2011, Zayasu's Z-101
Kishu, also a scramjet technology demonstrator, flew under scramjet power for nearly 210 seconds, reaching speeds upwards of Mach 5.1. In May of 2012, ARPA's Shi-133U boost-glide vehicle reached Mach 20 during a nine-minute test flight, and in 2017, Daitō tested its Shi-142 scramjet missile, which reached speeds in excess of Mach 8. Meanwhile, Rokkenjima's
Ifrit, which entered testing in 2021, is a hypersonic glide vehicle which, while representing a technological achievement, is seen by many in Daitō as little more than an elaborate distraction, lacking much in the way of payload capacity compared even to the Zircon missile. Similarly, proposals seen in some countries for converting the first stage of short-range ballistic missiles, while in theory being useful, have been deemed by higher-ups in the Daitōjin Armed Forces as being of limited practical value.
Scramjet diagramDaitō's currently active hypersonic missile efforts currently include at least two hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and as many as
four hypersonic cruise missiles leveraging scramjet propulsion. A scramjet, or supersonic ramjet, is essentially an air-breathing jet engine that reaches combustion with supersonic airflow, unlike traditional ramjets which use shock cones to reduce airflow to subsonic speeds. This form of propulsion allows for incredibly high rates of travel, but it needs to rely on a conventional source of power, whether it be a ramjet or a rocket booster, to reach those speeds in order to operate well. Of course, putting a ramjet/scramjet-powered weapon system into service has never been done by any nation before, making it pretty logical that this effort would lag behind any effort to reuse older technology and brute force in order to enter the hypersonic arena. Daitō's approach will result in a longer timeline to service for many of its systems, but it may well also result in far more capable weapon systems in the long run. Nonetheless, as has been seen in the last decade, other countries have had hypersonic weapons tested and in some cases brought into service. Despite Daitō's previous successes in this specific realm, there is no denying that the country has yet to entirely match that capability, but there is quite possibly a good reason for that too.
Conventional Hypersonics
Though it may seem obvious, as Daitō, unlike Rokkenjima, has never possessed nuclear weapons—though it has been described as "nuclear latent"—it has, throughout its history, never had a reason to even consider using hypersonic weapons to carry nuclear payloads. As a result, since the very start, it has needed to focus on technical challenges that wouldn't be faced under such circumstances, even if nuclear weapons have now, thankfully, been disposed of worldwide. Such challenges include developing proper targeting systems, which, owing to the buildup of plasma faced during flight, are presently inadequate for such a role. In the case of Rokkenjima's
Ifrit missile, which is ostensibly designed to hit a target the size of an aircraft carrier at roughly 1,600 kilometers, there has been little evidence to date suggesting that their targeting apparatus could achieve such a feat with a conventional warhead.
There is, of course, an argument to be made that new and more advanced weapons, hypersonic or not, offer little strategic value. Any exchange between two near-peer or peer-level powers would, after all, effectively destroy both nations economies, so unless a new weapon can neuter the opposition's ability to respond, current weapons are as good a hypersonic weapon, while being far, far cheaper. Strategic value, in this situation, can only truly be achieved with a weapon that
forces a shift in an opponent's strategy. To date, Zircon hasn't done so. Rokkenjima, however, has forced a major shift in Daitōjin Navy priorities thanks to the introduction of the
Ifrit, but it is important to note that this shift is based on the assumption that Rokkenjima will eventually get over the massive technical hurdles associated with targeting a moving vessel at range, not necessarily the understanding that they presently have.
Daitō's shortcomings shouldn't be ignored
A P-13 out of Shirasu Air Force Base carries an ARROW missile for its first captive carry flight, March 2020 It seems clear that the conversation about the modern hypersonic arms race has been slightly skewed by a combination of confusion about the latest defense buzzword and media sensationalism. But to call that the end of the story would mean ignoring a major catch: Daitō's hypersonic weapons programs have been riddled with failure in recent years. While looking back at hypersonic test programs operated by the Ministry of War over the past decade, ignoring some tech demonstrators mentioned before, you will find not only a list ripe with failures, but seemingly preventable ones as well. Many of these failures occurred
before reaching hypersonic velocities, meaning that it was tried and true technology like rocket boosters and stage separation mechanisms which went wrong. Most frustrating for the military, there was no data to be poured over with these sorts of failures, and thus, no lessons to be learned about the nature of hypersonic flight.
Out of forty-eight tests conducted since 2010, twelve failed due to problems with the missile's conventional rocket booster, with one other called a total failure for undisclosed reasons. Six more failed due to issues with the stage separation mechanisms or control fins, both of which are technologies Daitō has had in service for decades. An additional nine tests were considered partial failures after achieving hypersonic speeds prior to an issue with the vehicle. In all, the War Ministry has only had twenty successful hypersonic weapons tests since 2010, with the most recent in November of last year. That, however, was the only one of the last five tests to be successful. The most recent failure came in October, when a conventional booster failed again. With such frankly embarrassing failures, a few have started to question whether the program is being faced with sabotage.
But weapons tests are expected to fail, that being a part of their very nature. There's no telling how many undisclosed failures many nations have experienced in their own efforts, as press freedoms are questionable in many places around the world. The most egregious issue with the program is not that twenty-eight out of forty-eight tests at least partially failed, rather, it's that Daitō has only conducted 48 tests since 2010 to begin with. It's simply a matter of fact that, until recently, Daitō simply hadn't felt a pressing need to invest in hypersonic technology. But even after the defense apparatus shifted focus towards hypersonics, it remains merely
one area of focus. That means that hypersonic weapons have to compete for time on testing ranges with other developmental programs that have similarly far-reaching implications and national importance.
It's not simply military test ranges that are holding back the country's hypersonic efforts, though. There are only two wind tunnels in the country that can manage both the high speeds and the high temperatures associated with hypersonic testing, and both of them are owned by DNSA, which has its own programs to focus on. Daitō has earmarked roughly ¥80 billion ($500 million) to put toward wind tunnel facilities to ease this choke point, however, it's not the only one. Test range facilities
are expanding, but will remain limited for some time to come.
Reexamining the "Arms Race"
It wouldn't be fair to say that nobody is winning the current hypersonic arms race, because it seems clear that not all nations are pursuing this technology with the same goals. For a nation like Kaitaine, at the time already on the road to the chaos we now see with its division, fielding the first hypersonic weapons was of grave importance. These weapons, owing to similar issues with guidance technology as seen in more recent developments, offered little in the way of genuine strategic capability, but garnered the nation's weapon programs a great deal of attention and prestige. That mattered for a country which was on the verge of civil war. Kaitaine needed foreign buyers for its weapons in order to be able to afford to build their own in any real numbers. The same could be said for advanced missile systems.
Rokkenjima's hypersonic goals have much to do with presenting an image of military parity with much of the developed world, in keeping with their aim of being the dominant world power going into the future. The Ifrit system has forced the Daitōjin military to reconsider its approach to force projection, making it a successful strategic weapon even if it never proves capable of hitting an aircraft carrier at all. And then, there is Daitō, which is not reliant on foreign weapon sales to fund its own programs and does not view military dominance as imperative to its survival. Daitō has nothing to gain from rushing a hypersonic weapon into service beyond prestige, but prestige itself is a tricky business. Both Zircon and Ifrit have been "in service" for some time now, and it stands to reason that most of Daitō's missiles could be a few years behind them before becoming operational themselves.
But after that point, the hypersonic arms race will stop being about
when each nation brings them online and starts being about the strategic and tactical capability that these weapons provide. Daitō was poorly positioned to win the first leg of this race, but it is now well-positioned to win the second. And the truth is quite simple: while the first spring is about winning headlines, the second, while perhaps less prestigious in the eyes of the media, is aimed at winning wars.
Where we go from here
The earliest Daitōjin Hypersonic Weapons program, the
Air-launched Rapid Response Offensive Weapon, or
ARROW, has thus far been the most successful hypersonic weapons program undertaken by Daitō in the last ten years. With a range of 1,600 kilometers, it is, in theory, similar to the Rokkenjiman Ifrit, with the primary difference being that ARROW is capable of being launched from mid-air. While the targeting system is, owing to technical difficulties to be expected with such weapons at this time, somewhat restricted in capability, it has been demonstrated striking in the vicinity of moving targets as close as 100 meters, roughly the twenty meters lower than the circular error as an ICBM under the best conditions. In some circumstances, this accuracy has been reduced to anywhere between 200 and 350 meters, potentially making precise targeting nearly impossible. Nevertheless, with the exorbitant price-tag it, like any other hypersonic weapon, when it enters service later this year, it will likely see extremely limited use.
To summarize, however, while Daitō has fallen behind its peers in this particular field, it cannot be said that Daitō has lost, and indeed, it seems quite possible that it will, in fact, win this supposed arms race, if only because its goal is something entirely different to what current operators of the technology field.
