Chapter Five, Part One — The Long Road Ahead
I. — Origins and OverviewRyū Program Patch The Ryū Program, also known as
Project Ryū, was the third Daitōjin human spaceflight program carried out by NASDA, which, while not achieving it first, succeeded in preparing and landing humans on the moon by the end of 1969. Formally conceived during the Rokuda administration in early 1960 as a follow-up to Project Suzaku, it was first intended to carry a crew of three into low mundus orbit. At the time, it was proposed that missions could include ferrying crews to a space station, circumlunar flights, and eventually, crewed lunar landings. In May 1960, Dr. Yasuji Chujo, serving at the time as NASDA's Deputy Administrator, announced the Ryū program to representatives of Daitō's aerospace industry in a series of conferences. Preliminary specifications were laid out for a spacecraft with a
mission module cabin separate from the
command module—piloting and reentry cabin—and a
propulsion and equipment module. On the 18th of August, a feasibility study competition was announced, and on October 16, study contracts were awarded to Zayasu, Aizawa, and Negishi. Meanwhile, NASDA performed its own in-house spacecraft design studies led by Emon Uehara, to serve as a gauge to judge and monitor the three industry designs.
Following the successful launch and return of Suzaku 3, Prime Minister Shiba, during an address to the Imperial Diet, announced that Daitō would push forwards with the goal of landing a man on the moon before 1970. As a result, Project Ryū became, overnight, a matter of national prestige and a household name. For many, it was a chance to prove the strength of Daitōjin industry in the post-war world, as well as potentially a chance to boost investment in the country. But more than anything else, it would serve to inspire a generation, to show them that anything could be achieved so long as they tried. For the sake of future generations, it was argued, this endeavor was supremely important.
II. — NASDA Expansion At the time of Shiba's proposal, only one Daitōjin had flown in space merely two months prior. There was much doubt early on—even within NASDA's ranks—that his ambitious goal could be met. At times, there were proposals made by his administration as late as 1964, though ultimately never presented, for a joint Daitōjin-Achkaerinese lunar mission so as to eliminate the duplication of effort. With the clear goal of a crewed landing replacing the more nebulous goals of space stations and circumlunar flights, NASDA decided that, in order to make progress quickly and prevent cost-overruns, it would discard the feasibility study designs of Zayasu, Aizawa, and Negishi, and instead it would proceed with Uehara's command and service module design. The mission module was determined to be useful only as an extra room, and therefore, was held back for later missions. In late 1961, using this design as a baseline, they held another competition, ultimately contracting Zayasu to build the design, in part due to its long-standing partnership with the Agency.
In order to land humans on the surface of the moon within a decade, at the time the most significant burst of technological creativity and largest commitment of resources in peacetime ($164 billion, adjusted for inflation) ever made by a nation in peacetime until the Hōrōsha Program. At its peak, the Ryū program is estimated to have employed more than 400,000 people, all the while requiring the support of over 20,000 industrial firms and universities. This cost, though astronomical, paid off in helping to build the modern world as we know it. Everything from freeze-dried foods to integrated circuits and from fire-resistant materials to dialysis machines can, in some part, be traced to funding for Ryū and similar programs at the time.
IIa. MSC and LOCVertical Assembly Building (VAB) under construction, c.1965 It became clear that managing the Ryū program would far exceed the capabilities of Dr. Itokawa's Space Task Force (STF), which had been directing the nation's crewed program from NASDA's Otsu Research Center. As a result, in late 1962, Itokawa was given authorization to grow his organization into a new NASDA center, the Manned Spaceflight Complex. A site was chosen in Yuzawa, Fukui Prefecture, on land which was donated by Yushiro University, and NASDA's administrator, Ryuzō Dojima, announced its conversion on the 18th of September, 1961. It was also clear NASDA would outgrow its practice of controlling missions from its Kintei Air Force Base launch facilities in Shiojiri Prefecture, Tsukishima, so a new Mission Control Center would be included in the MSC. The Manned Spaceflight Complex would be renamed the "Kazumasa Toshinari Manned Spaceflight Complex", frequently abridged to the "Toshinari Space Center" in 1970, by the Imperial in honor of Prime Minister Kazumasa Toshinari's death in 1969.
It also became clear that Ryū would outgrow the Kintei launch facilities in Tsukishima. The two newest launch complexes were already being built for the Tenjin I and Ib rockets at the northernmost end: Launch Complexes 23 and 27. But an even bigger facility would be needed for the enormous rocket necessary for a crewed lunar mission, so land acquisition was undertaken starting in July 1961 for a Launch Operations Complex (LOC) immediately north of Kintei at Takeshima Island. The design, development and construction of the center was conducted by Dr. Iehisa Takashi, a former member of Dr. Itokawa's team at Susaki. Takashi was later named the LOC's first director. Construction began in September 1962.
The new Launch Operations Complex included Launch Complex 29 (LC-29), a Launch Control Center (LCC), and a 3.7 million cubic meter Vertical Assembly Building (VAB), in which the launch vehicle would be assembled on a mobile launcher platform and then moved by a crawler-transporter to one of several launch pads. Although more were planned, only Launch Complex 29A and 29B would be completed by October 1965, with 39C being finished a year later following delays. The LOC also included an Operations and Checkout Building (OCB), where Taka and Ryū spacecraft were initially received prior to being mated with their launch vehicles. There, the Ryū spacecraft could be tested in two vacuum chambers capable of simulating atmospheric pressures up to around 76 km, or in other words, nearly a vacuum. The Launch Operations Complex would be renamed to the Akasaki Space Center in 2022, following the death of the ūchunaut who had started it all.
IIb. Organization Administrator Dojima recognized that, in order to keep the Ryū program's costs under control, it would be necessary to develop greater project management skills in his organization. In order to accomplish this, he hired Dr. Kakutarō Hoshino for a high-ranking management position. Hoshino accepted, however, he required that he have a say in any NASDA reorganization necessary to effectively administer Ryū. Dojima then worked with Deputy Administrator Chujo to reorganize the Office of Crewed Spaceflight (OCSF). Hoshino was formally appointed Deputy Associate Administrator for Crewed Space Flight on the 26th of July, 1963. Under Dojima's reorganization, Doctors Itokawa and Takashi reported to Hoshino.
Based upon his experience on missile projects, Hoshino recognized that many skilled project managers could be found among the higher ranks of the Imperial Daitōjin Air Force, so he got Dojima's permission to recruit General Sakichi Kamei, who earned a reputation for his effective management of the Sekidō program, as OCSF program director. He was able to get the approval of Kamei's superiors to loan him to NASDA, however, this came with the condition that Kamei be made Ryū Program Director. Hoshino agreed to this proposal, and from January 1964 until January 1970, General Kamei served as the program's director, after which he returned to active duty.
III. — The DisasterIIIa. Plugs-out On the 21st of February, 1967, the crew of RT-204—ūchunauts Akira Sagara, Hayate Morita, and Takauji Sanada—entered their capsule as part of a "plugs out" test, intended to determine whether the spacecraft would operate nominally on internal power. Passing this test was necessary if NASDA wanted to make the March 7 launch date. The test was determined to have not been hazardous, a result of neither the spacecraft nor the rocket having been loaded with fuel or cryogenics and all pyrotechnic systems being disabled. Little did anyone present know, however, that none of the crew would exit the spacecraft alive.
At 2:07 PM, Sagara, then Sanada, and then finally Morita entered the command module in their pressure suits, and were strapped into their seats and hooked up to the spacecraft's oxygen and communication systems. It should be noted that Sagara noticed a faint odor in the air circulating within his suit which he described as reminding him of spoiled milk, and the simulated countdown was put on hold at 2:27 PM while air samples were taken. No cause of the odor could be determined, so the countdown resumed at 3:49 PM. During the investigation into the accident, the odor was found to have not been related to the fire. Three minutes after the count resumed, the hatch was installed. This hatch was made up of three parts: a removable inner hatch, which stayed inside the command module; a hinged outer hatch which was part of the spacecraft's heat shield; and an outer hatch cover which made up part of the launch escape system's cover, which protected the spacecraft from aerodynamic heating during launch and from exhaust in the event of an abort. The boost hatch cover was partially, though not fully, latched in place as a result of the flexible boost protective cover being slightly distorted by cabling run under it to provide simulated internal power. After the hatches were sealed, the air in the cabin was replaced with pure oxygen at 115 kPa, 14 kPa higher than atmospheric pressure. The simulated countdown was put on hold again at 7:27 PM while attempts were made to troubleshoot a communications problem. All countdown functions up to the simulated internal power transfer had been successfully completed by 7:07 PM, and and at 7:20 the count remained on hold at T minus 10 minutes.
IIIb. The Fire During this hold, the crew spent their time running through their checklist again, when at 7:33:57, a momentary increase in AC Bus 2 voltage occurred. Nine seconds later, one of the ūchunauts, generally believed to have been Sagara, exclaimed "Fire!". This was followed by two seconds of scuffling heard over his open microphone. This was followed at 7:34:06.1 by another ūchunaut, likely Morita based on recordings of the incident, saying "Uh, we've got a fire in here.", which in turn was followed by a badly garbled transmission which said, roughly, "We've got a bad fire... We're trying to escape... Let us out!" which ended with a cry of pain.
The fire, fed by the cabin's pure oxygen atmosphere, caused the pressure to rise to 200 kPa, far above the spacecraft's inner wall. This resulted in the capsule rupturing, with fire and gas rushing out through open access panels to two levels of the pad's service structure. The intense heat, dense smoke, and ineffective gas masks designed for toxic fumes hampered the ground crew's attempts to rescue the crew. Immediately, there were fears that the command module had exploded, or at least would, and the resultant fire could cause the solid fuel rockets in the LES to ignite, which would have likely killed nearby ground personnel and potentially destroyed the pad. As the pressure was released by the cabin rupture, the rush of gases inside caused flames to spread across the cabin, starting the second phase of the disaster. The third phase began when most of the oxygen was consumed and was replaced with atmospheric air, which practically quenched the fire and left high concentrations of carbon monoxide and heavy smoke inside the cockpit, as well as large deposits of soot which soon covered most surfaces.
IV. — The Investigation In keeping with Deputy Administrator Chujo's instructions under
Management Instruction 8713.6, which defined
Mission Failure Investigation Policy And Procedures, NASDA's existing accident procedures, based on military aircraft accident investigation, were modified to provide the Deputy Administrator the option of performing independent investigations of major failures, beyond those for which the various Program Office officials were normally responsible. It declared, quote,
"It is NASDA policy to investigate and document the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the conduct of its space and aeronautical activities and to take appropriate corrective actions as a result of the findings and recommendations." Immediately after the fire, Administrator Dojima asked Prime Minister Giichi Inukai to allow NASDA to handle the investigation according to its established procedure, pledging that it would be truthful in assessing blame and that it would keep the appropriate members of the Diet informed. Deputy Administrator Chujo then directed the establishment of the Ryū 204 Review Board, chaired by Dr. Itokawa, which included Ūchunaut Kanji Akasaki, spacecraft designer Emon Uehara, and eight others. Chujo ordered that all Ryū 1 hardware be impounded, to be released only under the authorization of the board. After thorough stereo photographic documentation of the CM-07 interior, crews began the long and painstaking process of disassembling the spacecraft using procedures developed on the identical CM-08 spacecraft and conducted a thorough investigation into each part. The board also reviewed the crew's autopsy reports and interviewed witnesses. The board finally published its report on the 19th of May, 1967, in which they identified several major factors which caused the fire and the ūchunauts' deaths, which included the following:
‣ An ignition source, most probably related to, quote, "vulnerable wiring carrying spacecraft power" and "vulnerable plumbing carrying a combustible and corrosive coolant".
‣ A pure oxygen atmosphere at higher than atmospheric pressure.
‣ A cabin sealed with a hatch cover which, given the circumstances, could not be removed quickly enough at a high pressure.
‣ An extensive distribution of combustible materials in the cabin.
‣ Inadequate emergency preparedness, such as rescue or medical assistance, as well as crew escape.
In later years, many would come to point to the Ryū 1 disaster and the response, which included numerous redesigns to hardware carried aboard the spacecraft, as being the moment that Daitō lost the race to be first to the moon, as these changes would result in delays to the program.